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In the past decade, the entertainment industry has waged a very
successful legal campaign against online copyright infringements. In a
series of high-profile decisions, content industries have persuaded courts to
accept expansive interpretations of contributory enforcement, to create
novel doctrines of copyright infringement, and to apply broad
interpretations of statutory damage provisions. Many private file sharers,
technology companies, university administrators, and Internet service
providers have felt the reach of this litigation effort. Yet a significant
empirical anomaly exists: even as the copyright industry has ramped up the
level of deterrence, online copyright infringements continue unabated.
Why has the legal battle against file sharers been so ineffective? The
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most straightforward explanation is that infringers are not deterred, either
because the probability of getting caught remains remote or because the
sanctions are not sufficiently salient. If that is the case, the expansive
statutory damage award remedies in decisions such as Capitol Records v.
Thomas-Rasset and Sony BMG v. Tenenbaum carry renewed promise for
the entertainment industry.
In this Article we claim that this deterrence-based approach will
prove futile and even counterproductive to the goals of copyright holders.
We argue that copyright law faces conditions similar to Prohibition and
other historical episodes of enforcement failure. When infringements are
widespread, effective deterrence cannot be attained without raising
enforcement to levels that undermine the support for the underlying rules.
As a result, enforcement has the inadvertent effect of moving behavior in
the opposite direction from that intended by the law. In the context of
copyright law, enforcement has increased the gap between the social and
legal perceptions of the law. Because file sharers, as a group, perceive
copyright litigation as excessive, this inadvertently strengthens opposition
to the legally protected interests of copyright law.
To further our understanding of the interplay between enforcement
and public attitudes, we conduct two empirical studies on norms and
copyright law. The results confirm that copyright enforcement is a double-
edged sword. While stringent sanctions have a modest deterrent effect on
file-sharing behavior, they increase anti-copyright sentiments among
frequent offenders. This raises a spectacular challenge for copyright
enforcement: the more copyright owners push to step up sanctions for
copyright infringements, the more the public resents the protected rights.
Consequently, stepping up sanctions tends to increase-rather than
decrease-the rate and frequency of infringing activities. Our key results
suggest, therefore, that more stringent copyright enforcement will further
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I. INTRODUCTION
Digital downloading and file sharing present unprecedented
challenges to the enforcement of copyright law.' These new technologies
greatly facilitate unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted
material. Evidence suggests that there are roughly ten million simultaneous
users of peer-to-peer technology at any given time.2 Sharing unlicensed
copyrighted materials is now a part of teenagers' everyday lives; the
amount of time spent downloading unlicensed content significantly
outweighs that of visiting record stores or downloading legally from
authorized sources, such as iTunes.3 The average teenager has an average
1. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT Ill (2001) (reviewing the various challenges
presented by new technology).
2. John Boudreau, Illegal File Sharing Showing No Letup, SEATTLE TIMES, July 3, 2006,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2003101281_btfilesharingO3
.html. See also John Borland, Open-Source P2P Projects Keep Swapping, CNET NEWS (July 15, 2005),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1032_3-5789087.html; Simon Crerar, Illegal File-Sharing As Popular As
Ever, TIMES (London), Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/arts and entertainment/music/article7l5426.ece. After the outcomes in Napster and Grokster, file-
sharing activities relocated to various BitTorrent sites. See Ernesto, Filesharing Report Shows Explosive
Growth for uTorrent, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 26, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/p2p-statistics-080426
(reporting that the number of uTorrent users worldwide more than doubled in 2008 compared to 2009).
Because of the decentralized nature of the most current generation of file-sharing technologies, it is
increasingly more difficult to obtain accurate data on the levels of file sharing; however, several
indicators suggest that file sharing remains widespread. See Robert Siciliano, P2P File Sharing on
College Campuses, MCAFEE BLOG CENT. (Sept. 25, 2010, 3:46 PM), http://blogs.mcafee.com/
consumer/identity-theft/p2p-file-sharing-on-college-campuses (describing inadvertent instances of file
sharing); Kate Holton, US. Single Digital Music Sales Flat This Year: Nielsen, REUTERS (Sept. 27,
2010, 4:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/27/us-sales-us-idUSTRE68Q2FM20100927
(discussing how digital music sales in the U.S. have stalled).
3. See David Goldman, Music's Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half CNN MONEY (Feb. 3, 2010,
9:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster-musicindustry/index.htm?
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of over 800 illegally copied songs on his or her digital music player or
personal computer.4
This is a remarkable trend given the intensive efforts by the
entertainment industry to halt the unauthorized dissemination of
copyrighted material online. Over the past decade, copyright holders have
waged a highly successful legal campaign.5 In a series of high-profile court
decisions, the entertainment industry has persuaded courts to accept
expansive interpretations of intermediary liability,6 to create novel
doctrines of copyright infringement,7 and to apply broad interpretations of
statutory damage provisions.8 The reach of this litigation strategy has been
widely felt. For example, novel, innovative technologies have been
banned,' university administrators"o and content-sharing websites have
received cease-and-desist letters,11 and over 20,000 individuals have
hpt-T2 (reporting a drop in music sales from $14.6 billion in 1999 to $6.3 billion in 2009); Ethan
Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2007, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SBII 7444575607043728-oEugjUqEtTolhWJawejgR3LjRAw
20080320.html?mod-rss free.
4. In a sample of 5600 consumers who were willing to share their iPod listening statistics, the
average player held a collection of over 3500 songs. Paul Lamere, What's On Your iPod?, ORACLE
BLOGS (May 22, 2006), http://blogs.sun.com/plamere/entry/what s onyour ipod. See also Dan
Sabbagh, Average Teenager's iPod Has 800 Illegal Music Tracks, TIMES (London), June 16, 2008,
available at http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech and web/personal-tech/article4144585.
ece.
5. For a description and discussion of this campaign, see infra Part II.
6. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001)
(confirming district court finding that plaintiffs would likely be successful in establishing that Napster
would be liable as a contributory and vicarious infringer).
7. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster Ill), 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (holding
that distributing software with the manifest intent to promote copyright infringement can render the
software's distributor liable for the infringing actions of third parties).
8. Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cvl446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009). See also Dave Itzkoff, Student Fined $675, 000 in Downloading Case,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009, 12:34 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/judge-rules-
student-is-liable-in-music-download-case/. In subsequent litigation, the award of $675,000 was reduced
by the district court to $67,500, but was reinstated by the First Circuit. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v.
Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010), rev'd, Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052, U.S. App.
LEXIS 19086 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011). See also Milton J. Valencia, Court Upholds Fine in Music
Download Case, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2011/09/20/federalappealscourt reinstates_675kfine against student convicted of downlo
adingmusic/.
9. Napster 1, 239 F.3d at 1021-24 (confirming that the a peer-to-peer file sharing program could
be liable as a contributory and vicarious infringer); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 350-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that defendant's online posting of MP3 files for access
by individuals who could prove that they owned a CD copy was not protected fair use).
10. Anne Broache, RIAA Threatens 19 Universities with Lawsuits, CNET NEWS (Oct. 18, 2007,
11:16 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9799840-7.html.
11. See, e.g., Seth Sutel, MTV Owner Viacom Demands That YouTube Remove More Than
1254
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entered into settlement agreements in order to avoid costly litigation.12
So why has the legal battle against file sharers been so ineffective? 3
One plausible explanation is that individuals are not sufficiently deterred
because they are convinced that the probability of getting caught remains
remote given the vast amount of downloads that occur at any given
moment in time. If so, two court decisions bring renewed promise to the
entertainment industry's litigation effort. In one high-profile case, a single
mother was ordered to pay $1.92 million for sharing twenty-four songs
online.14 In another highly publicized file-sharing case, a jury levied
$675,000 on a Boston University graduate student for infringing copyrights
on thirty songs.' 5 Moreover, if an increase in the level of deterrence is the
solution, the entertainment industry is right to find inspiration in current
French legislation that restricts Internet access to copyright violators. 16
In this Article, we claim that this deterrence-based approach will
100,000 Unauthorized Video Clips, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-02-02-viacom-youtube-x.htm.
12. How To Not Get Sued for File Sharing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 2006),
http://www.eff.org/wp/how-not-get-sued-file-sharing.
13. See, e.g., Crerar, supra note 2; Ernesto, supra note 2.
14. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-CV-01497 (MJD/LIB), 2009 WL 2030495
(D. Minn. June 18, 2009). See also David Kravets, Jury in RIAA Trial Slaps $2 Million Fine on Jammie
Thomas, WIRED (June 18, 2009, 6:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/riaa-jury-slaps-
2-million-fine-on-jammie-thomas; David Kravets, RIAA Jury Finds Minnesota Woman Liable for
Piracy, Awards $222,000, WIRED (Oct. 4, 2007, 2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2007/1 0/riaa-jury-finds/.
15. Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cvl 1446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009). See also Itzkoff, supra note 8.
16. On October 22, 2009, the Constitutional Council of France approved the HADOPI law or
Creation and Internet Law. Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la
creation sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 on Promoting the Dissemination and Protection of
Creation on the Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], June 13, 2009, No. 2, (English translation available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank-mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf); Eric Pfanner, France
Approves Wide Crackdown on Net Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/technology/23net.html. The law includes a controversial "three-
strike" procedure, which requires Internet service providers to suspend the Internet service of the
connection owner, as opposed to the actual accused infringer, for a period between two months to one
year. The accused owner is blacklisted and third-party Internet service providers are prevented from
providing the accused owner an Internet connection. See Pfanner, supra. The United Kingdom joined
the approach of web disconnection measures with the passage of the Digital Economy Act on June 8,
2010. Digital Economy Act, 2010, 59 Eliz. 2, c. 24, (U.K.). The Digital Economy Act includes
provisions that limit the quality of Internet connections or that block access to a location on the Internet
"from which a substantial amount of material has been, is being or is likely to be made available in
infringement of copyright," or a location which "facilitatels]" such behavior. Id. § 17. See also Emma
Barnett, MPs Pass Digital Economy Bill, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/7566427/MPs-pass-Digital-Economy-Bill.html.
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prove futile and even counterproductive to the goals of copyright holders.
When noncompliance and infringements are widespread, effective
deterrence cannot be attained without raising enforcement to levels that
undermine support for the underlying rules. But when enforcement reaches
levels that are perceived as normatively excessive, this can have the
inadvertent effect of moving behavior in the opposite direction from that
intended by the law. If individuals perceive enforcement as excessive, this
may reinforce or even strengthen a belief that the legal regime is not
legitimate or that a legal rule is unjust.17 Once the public resents the
protected rights, the stepping up of sanctions may increase-rather than
decrease-the rate and frequency of infringing activities. As historians
have argued, countervailing public reactions have played a significant role
in the demise of the Prohibition movement and other historical episodes of
enforcement failure.' 8
We argue that the same dynamic is at work today in the enforcement
of copyright law by the content industries. It is becoming increasingly clear
that the deterrence-based approach to copyright enforcement is severely
damaging the public image of copyright industries specifically, and
copyright law more generally. Because unauthorized file sharing has a
normative component,19 the litigation initiatives of the content industries
adversely affect the public attitude toward copyright law. Overall then, the
litigation campaign might be counterproductive to the interests of copyright
holders.
Previous work on counterproductive normative effects has been
theoretical in nature.20 We aim to narrow the gap between theory and
empiricism by conducting two experimental studies. Copyright
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
19. Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms ofFile Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
577, 584-87 (2006) (presenting evidence on the various sources of anti-copyright norms); Daniel J.
Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 39, 48-53 (2004); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 534-47 (2003) (describing norms in
file-sharing communities).
20. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) (suggesting that gradual approaches are more effective when
anti-legal norms are in place); Francesco Parisi & Georg von Wangenheim, Legislation and
Countervailing Effects from Social Norms (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics
Working Paper Series No. 04-31, 2004), available at http://www.gmu.eduldepartments/
law/faculty/papers/docs/04-31.pdf (describing a cycle of opinion formation in which public acts of
disobedience and protest undermine the legitimacy of legislation, which leads to further opposition).
See also William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2000) (suggesting that
misguided enforcement priorities can inadvertently shift public support away from the underlying laws).
1256 [Vol. 84:1251
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infringement presents a natural case study on this subject, given the
emergence of an anti-copyright culture among teenagers and the strong
normative component of unauthorized file sharing.21 We examine backlash
effects as a possible explanation of the pervasiveness of file sharing in the
face of copyright litigation. Specifically, we seek to test the hypothesis that
punitive sanctions have the unintended effect of strengthening resistance to
copyright enforcement among file sharers. We test this hypothesis in two
studies that examine the influence of copyright enforcement on (1) self-
reported normative attitudes in the first phase and (2) download behavior
when the probability of detection falls to zero in the second phase. In this
second phase, we manipulated the severity and certainty of punishment,
while holding the expected costs of punishment constant.
The results suggest that when normative positions conflict with legal
rules, enforcement is a double-edged sword. First, we find that punitive
enforcement creates a backlash effect by strengthening prior anti-copyright
positions among frequent copyright offenders. Second, punitive
enforcement measures are most valuable-both on a normative and
behavioral level-among infrequent offenders who have not yet
internalized any normative position against copyright law. Third, raising
the level of the sanction, rather than increasing the probability of
apprehension, is a more effective means to induce deterrence. Our findings
present a vexing policy dilemma for copyright holders. Because
technological obstacles prevent perfect enforcement on the Internet, the
content industries cannot afford to neglect public attitudes. At the same
time, in order to maintain effective levels of enforcement, legal sanctions
must be elevated to levels that appear counterproductive from a normative
perspective. Our findings show a backlash effect for all offenders, but
frequent offenders especially, who will download more if previously faced
with punitive enforcement measures. The observed backlash effect among
frequent infringers casts doubt upon the current enforcement tactics
employed by the entertainment industry. By focusing litigation exclusively
on frequent offenders, copyright holders bolster anti-copyright positions
among this group, while foregoing opportunities to promote pro-copyright
norms among occasional infringers. Our key results suggest, therefore, that
the imposition of stricter penalties for copyright infringements will further
erode respect for copyright law and may prove counterproductive to the
copyright industries.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part II describes the litigation
21. See supra sources cited in note 19. See also infra Part III.
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campaign waged by the content industries in the past decade. Part III
discusses the normative effect of litigation as an enforcement strategy. In
Part IV, we explain the methodological approach and major findings of our
studies. Part V relates our findings to some of the policy issues involved in
the enforcement of copyrights. Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND: THE LITIGATION CAMPAIGN BY CONTENT
INDUSTRIES
When online file sharing initially became widespread, content
industries disputed the legality of file sharing.22 Once courts established
that noncommercial file sharing by private users directly infringed the
rights of copyright holders, the entertainment industry pursued the
developers of file-sharing platforms on the basis of intermediary liability.
And so, the first generation of file-sharing technology, represented by
Napster, became the subject of a high-profile litigation battle. At the end of
this closely watched litigation, the Ninth Circuit established that copyright
law implicates developers of centralized peer-to-peer technology by way of
contributory liability: file-sharing technologies materially contributed to
copyright infringements if they provided "the site and facilities" that
enabled direct infringements, such as hosting a central list of the files on
each user's computer.23
When, however, the final verdict in Napster arrived, a new generation
of file-sharing applications was already in use. Though functionally
equivalent to their predecessors, these file-sharing platforms evaded the
contributory liability standard applied in Napster by decentralizing the
technology and removing the role of central servers. 24 When content
22. Before file-sharing technologies, content industries had won various copyright claims against
commercial applications involved in unauthorized reproductions and novel Internet services that
reproduced music. For instance, record companies won a copyright suit against MP3.com, which
allowed subscribers to play music that they owned, borrowed, or had previously purchased over the
Internet. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The court
did not uphold the defense's argument that the service of MP3.com merely allowed subscribers to
"space shift" sound recordings that they owned without carrying around physical CDs because the
service was neither transformative nor productive. Id. at 351. According to the court, the use of a
different medium did not render the use transformative. Id. See also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood,
150 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by the operator of a service that
retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over telephone lines); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television
Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by television news
agencies that copied copyrighted news footage and retransmitted it to news organizations).
23. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. See, e.g., Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation
Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005) ("The [recording] industry's victory in
Napster was fleeting as publicity over the issue increased awareness of P2P technology and users
[Vol. 84:12511258
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industries challenged this second generation of technologies, they were
initially unsuccessful in the district court and appellate court stages. Courts
rejected the application of Napster to decentralized file-sharing services
because liability for contributory infringement implies "actual knowledge
of infringement at a time when [file-sharing services] can use that
knowledge to stop the particular infringement." 25
Ultimately, however, the industry was victorious again. The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court decisions, holding that software providers
are accountable for copyright violations if they invoke copyright-infringing
uses and take active steps to that end.26 Adopting the inducement concept
from patent law, 27 the Supreme Court held that copyright holders can bring
suit against commercial agents who distribute products "with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement." 28 Lower courts are
currently in the process of applying the inducement standard to a third
generation of more decentralized, torrent-based file-sharing technologies.
The outcome of this litigation, and more generally, the immediate fate of
torrent-based technologies, largely depends on the evidence required to
establish the existence of "active steps . . . taken with the purpose of
bringing about infringing acts."29
Despite obtaining legal successes against developers of software
applications that "facilitated" online copyright infringements,30 content
industries were unable to prevent the further development and distribution
of additional file-sharing technologies. And so, as the number of online
copyright infringements continued to skyrocket, the entertainment industry
redirected its focus to users of file-sharing technologies. In September
2003, the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") began
sending subpoenas to Internet service providers, demanding the names of
individuals who were allegedly sharing music on file-sharing networks.
flocked to decentralized networks like Grokster and KaZaa, making the tracking of P2P use more
difficult.") (footnote omitted).
25. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (citing Napster 1, 239 F.3d at 1020-22), aff'd, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II),
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
26. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster lII), 545 U.S. 913, 940-41 (2005).
27. Id. at 935 (citing Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1912); Kalem Co. v. Harper
Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F.
1005, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1896); Rumford Chem. Works v. Hecker, 20 F. Cas. 1342, 1346 (C.C.D.N.J.
1876) (No. 12,133)).
28. Id. at 936-37.
29. Id. at 938.
30. See supra text accompanying note 23.
2011] 1259
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The lawsuits targeted individuals who stored large amounts of music files
in publicly accessible folders on their computers. These cases settled at an
average of $3000." A second wave of lawsuits followed in October 2003,
when the RIAA initiated eighty additional lawsuits against individual peer-
to-peer file sharers. 32 From September 2003 to December 2004, the
recording industry issued over 3400 individual lawsuits against users of
peer-to-peer file-sharing technology.33 In November 2004, the Motion
Picture Artists Association ("MPAA") joined the fray 34 when it launched a
set of lawsuits against individuals who had allegedly shared a substantial
amount of movies online.35 By August 2005, the MPAA had initiated six
rounds of lawsuits against individual file traders. 36 As of November 2010,
the RIAA filed at least 18,000 lawsuits against individuals.37 Additionally,
content industry representatives have sent pre-litigation letters to
universities requesting students to come forward to pay a non-negotiable
settlement amount.
In 2008, a few individuals refused the settlement offers by the RIAA.
Although the RIAA's threat letters routinely claimed that court awards
could be as much as $150,000, this claim had never been tested in court. In
the ensuing litigation, an initial issue concerned the required proof of
dissemination of a copyrighted work. Although it can easily be
demonstrated that, at one time, a file sharer had a file in a publicly
31. This average gradually increased to $3000. Paul Roberts, RIAA Sues 532 'John Does,'
PCWORLD (Jan. 21, 2004, 1:00 PM), available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/1 14387/riaasues_
532_ john does.html.
32. RIAA Launches Second Wave of File-Swapper Suits, OUT-LAW NEWS (Oct. 31, 2003),
http://www.out-law.com/page-4029.
33. File Sharing Goes to High Court, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.wired.com/
entertainment/music/news/2004/12/65995.
34. Because the amount of motion pictures being exchanged over peer-to-peer networks had
increased dramatically in 2004, mainly due to increased broadband width and improved compression
technologies, the movie industry group would no longer sit back. See, e.g., Grant Gross, MPAA to Sue
Movie File Swappers, PCWORLD (Nov. 4, 2004, 4:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/l18485/
mpaato sue movie file swappers.html.
35. Hollywood Sues Alleged File Swappers, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 16, 2004, 8:34 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6504024/ns/technologyand-science-tech and_gadgets/t/hollywood-
sues-alleged-file-swappers/.
36. See Thomas Mennecke, Movie Studios vs. Internet Movie Thieves, Round Six!, SLYCK NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.slyck.com/story877_MovieStudios-Vs_InternetMovieThievesRound
Six.
37. Andrei Toma, USCG Making the RIAA Look Soft, CYBERBEAR (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://cyberbeartracks.com/?p-95 ("The campaign ended just last year, with over 18,000 law suits.").
38. See Press Release, RIAA, 23 New Schools to Receive Latest Round of RIAA Pre-Lawsuit
Letters (July 18, 2007), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id-780E8751-0E03-4258-D651-
F991B66E1708. See, e.g., Nick Semenkovich, RIAA Pre-Litigation Letters Sent to MIT, TECH, May 8,
2007, at 1.
1260 [Vol. 84:1251
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accessible folder, it is very difficult, as a technical matter, to provide
evidence that the file has actually been downloaded from the file sharer's
computer.39 Courts ultimately decided that dissemination could be
presumed on the basis of accessibility.40 The next issue concerned the
alleged harm caused by an individual accused of file sharing.41 While it is
hard to estimate the overall impact of file sharing on the revenue base of
content industries, 42 it is even more difficult to discern the precise damage
imposed by an individual act of file sharing.43 Fortunately for copyright
holders, the Federal Copyright Act does not require copyright holders to
provide evidence of actual damages in all circumstances." The Copyright
39. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218-19 (D. Minn. 2008)
(holding that liability for violation of the exclusive right of distribution requires actual dissemination).
The Capitol Records court cited Hotaling v. Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199,
203 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a library makes a work available to the public it has completed
all the steps necessary for distribution), but the court declined to follow it.
40. See Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
41. Because most suspected infringers likely prefer not to incur the costs of litigation, some of
the more complex legal issues relating to the enforcement of copyright with regard to file sharing have
not been subject to rigorous litigation.
42. Some studies, for instance, contest the claim that file sharing has a negative impact on music
industry sales. See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on
Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2007); Andy McCue, Study: Falling CD
Sales Can't Be Blamed on P2P, CNET NEWS (June 14, 2005, 11:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2 100-
1027_3-5746291.html (discussing a study finding that file sharing has no negative impact on CD sales).
But see Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. &
EcON. 1, 14-17 (2006) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Creative Destruction] (presenting evidence that file
sharing diminishes recording industry revenues); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High
C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49
J.L. & ECON. 29, 30 (2006) (showing data indicating that downloading reduced purchases by
individuals in their sample by about 10 percent during 2003). See generally Stan J. Liebowitz,
Economists Examine File Sharing and Music Sales, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 145 (Gerhard Illing & Martin Peitz eds., 2006) (providing an overview of the empirical work
that supports the position that file sharing hurts copyright owners).
43. For instance, in order to estimate the harm imposed by one file in a public accessible folder,
one needs to gather information about (1) how many times that the file was downloaded, and (2) how
many of these downloads caused individuals not to buy the song through legally available alternatives.
Such information is simply not available. Torrent technologies complicate the former inquiry because
any act of downloading captures fragmented parts from any number of different users. For a general
explanation of the operation of peer-to-peer networks, see Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L.
REv. 679, 745-50 (2003).
44. Beginning in 1790, the first Congress enacted the original Federal Copyright Act. Copyright
Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. The original purpose of statutory damages was to provide a minimum
award to copyright owners because of the difficulty of measuring actual damages and profits. See
Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement
Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 265,
273-74 (2009). A fundamental underpinning of Congress's enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, was its concern with potentially outrageous statutory awards. Berg,
supra, at 297-98. Congress attempted to circumvent such results by using a novel rhetorical explication
in the 1976 Act. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
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Act allows copyright holders to elect to apply statutory damages at any
time during the litigation,4 5 and as it turns out, courts are willing to apply
statutory damage provisions quite liberally. In 2009, a defendant was
ordered to pay $1.92 million for sharing twenty-four songs online.46 In
another case, a jury levied $675,000 against a defendant for sharing thirty
songs.47 These high awards are possible because the Copyright Act of 1976
changed the old rule of awards per infringement to awards per infringed
work.48 Moreover, courts adopted a broad interpretation of "willful
infringement," which in turn enhanced the potential statutory award.49 The
generous application of statutory awards certainly bolsters the deterring
effects of the entertainment industry's litigation effort.50
The litigation campaign introduced several legal innovations, each
with a different set of consequences. First, content industries managed to
expand the scope of their rights by extending the doctrine of intermediary
liability. These doctrinal developments increase the burden on software
developers by focusing on (1) the potential for technological enhancements
to enable developers to monitor and control direct infringement, and (2) the
intentions of indirect infringers as a source of infringement. In this process,
courts also removed some of the safe harbor assumptions that were
traditionally associated with the dual nature of many technologies.51
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 451-63 (2009). According to Pamela
Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, however, Congress did not limit anything and only exacerbated its
own unease. Id. at 453-54. In pertinent part, Samuelson and Wheatland argue that the 1976 Act has not
had the desired impact Congress anticipated, as evidenced by the latest statutory damage awards in
peer-to-peer file sharing cases. Id.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). The 1976 Act limits the availability of statutory damages to
copyright holders who register their works. If an infringement was committed willfully, the court may
increase the award of damages to a sum of $150,000. Id.
46. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-CV-01497 (MJD/LIB), 2009 WL 2030495
(D. Minn. June 18, 2009). See also Kravets, supra note 14.
47. Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cv11446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009). See also Itzkoff, supra note 8.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
49. Kate Cross, Note, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry is Winning Substantial
Judgments Against Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1031, 1041-42
(2010) (discussing whether excessive punitive damages jurisprudence should be applied to statutory
damages cases in which defendants have received disproportionately high, and arguably punitive-like,
statutory damages judgments against them). It has also been suggested that courts should apply the
modem punitive damages test set forth in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), to
copyright cases that involve grossly disproportionate statutory judgments against individual infringers.
"If one song on iTunes costs ninety-nine cents to purchase, then a judgment awarding $80,000 for one
song is not only grossly disproportionate but 'obviously unreasonable by any measure."' Cross, supra,
at 1038.
50. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 44, at 452-56.
51. The courts in Napster and Grokster avoided the issue of noninfringing uses. See A&M
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Second, despite the legal uncertainty, content industries aggressively
enforced these evolving entitlements against private individuals. The
resulting mass-settlement campaign introduced a form of reverse class
action litigation against dispersed, poorly organized defendants.5 2 Finally,
copyright holders convinced courts to apply expansive remedies to enforce
online copyright infringements. 53
The legal success of this campaign has not, however, produced a
satisfactory reduction of online copyright infringements for content
industries.54 This has prompted the industries to forge cooperation with
service providers55 and to pursue new legislation that would block Internet
access to accused infringers. 56
In the next part, we document the impact of the litigation campaign on
public attitudes regarding file sharing and the entertainment industry.
III. LITIGATION AND NORMATIVE OVERDETERRENCE
A. LITIGATION AND NORMATIVE BACKLASH
As the brief overview in Part II illustrates, copyright holders have
waged a highly successful litigation campaign against file sharing. In a
series of high-profile court decisions, the entertainment industry
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
52. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 685, 688 (2005)
(advocating a procedure of claim consolidation among similarly positioned defendants); David W.
Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property Reverse Private
Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1696 (2005) (coining the phrase "reverse
private attorney general litigation" to refer to aggregated claims initiated by well-resourced plaintiffs
against multiple individual defendants).
53. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cvl 1446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-CV-1497,
2009 WL 2030495 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009).
54. See Goldman, supra note 3; Smith, supra note 3 (reporting a decline in music sales over the
past decade). See also Crerar, supra note 2; David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads,
After 5 Years of RIAA Litigation, WIRED (Sept. 4, 2008, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.
com/threatlevel/2008/09/proving-file-sh/ (quoting Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
Lohmann's evaluation of the litigation campaign: "If the goal is to reduce file sharing,. . . it's a
failure.").
55. Larry Dignan, Why RIAA, ISP Cooperation May Deliver Returns for Both Sides, ZDNET (Jan.
29, 2009, 3:33 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/why-riaa-isp-cooperation-may-deliver-returns-for-
both-sides/1 1893; Greg Sandoval, Comcast, Cox Cooperating with RIAA in Antipiracy Campaign,
CNET NEWS (Mar. 25, 2009, 9:49 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10204047-93.html.
56. Greg Sandoval, RIAA Gives Thumbs Up to France's Three-Strike Law, CNET NEWS, (Apr.
8, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10215602-93.html.
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successfully lobbied for the enforcement of expansive interpretations of
contributory enforcement, the creation of novel doctrines of copyright
infringement, and broad applications of statutory damage provisions. In this
process, the entertainment industry was able to close down several new
technologies5 7  and compel many individuals to settle individual
infringement cases.
As the legal campaign continues to evolve, its negative impact on
public attitudes toward content industries is unmistakable. While the
enforcement of copyright law against music pirates and commercial
bootleggers has traditionally received broad public support, the massive
litigation against teenagers and college students has proven to be much
more controversial-perhaps, in part, because the general public identifies
somewhat with copying music in one's home, especially by individuals
living under the same roof. The mass litigation campaign against
noncommercial infringers is an exceptional extension of the breadth of
copyright enforcement. Historically, copyright enforcement suits have
targeted commercial agents or "pirates" who sell bootlegs of live
recordings and unlicensed reproductions of records, software, and video
games, rather than individuals infringing for personal use.58
Additionally, the litigation campaign involved a number of awkward
public relations incidents that likely contributed to the dwindling public
support. For instance, media outlets reported that content industries accused
both a twelve-year-old New York girl whose mother lived in low income
57. See supra Part II.
58. LITMAN, supra note 1, at Ill ("Our copyright laws have, until now, focused primarily on the
relationships among those who write works of authorship and disseminate those works to the public.");
Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and
Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1466, 1488 (1995) ("Copyright owners have traditionally
avoided targeting end users of copyrighted works."); Wu, supra note 43, at 714 ("One is pressed to find
any example of copyright law being enforced against individuals for home copying (as opposed to
commercial activity) prior to 1990."). See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that contributory liability could be imposed on defendant who operated a swap
meet where many of the vendors sold counterfeit goods); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No.
00 Civ. 4660(SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (record
companies brought action against an Internet site operator that provided links to pirated copies of
copyrighted musical recordings); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Computer & Entm't, Inc., No. C96-0187
WD, 1996 U.S. Dist. WL 511619 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 1996) (issuing a preliminary injunction against
defendants who sold video game duplication devices for Nintendo game cartridges); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (issuing a preliminary injunction against a defendant
who made available unauthorized copies of Sega games on a fee-based Internet bulletin board). See
generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality,
Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 731 (2003) (explaining the distinctions between
commercial piracy and noncommercial personal infringements).
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housing run by the New York City Housing Authority59 and an eighty-
three-year-old woman who had died over a month earlier.60 To many
observers, the industry's litigate-or-settle practice reflects an unfair power
dynamic. Since alleged infringers so frequently choose to settle in order to
avoid the expense of litigation, many legal questions remain unanswered.
According to some, the almost mechanical administration of the settlement
payments is akin to blackmail, extortion, or harassment.61 Moreover, the
legitimacy of the litigation effort is undermined by a lack of
comprehensiveness. Due to the large number of offenders, any instance of
individual enforcement seems random. On the one hand, an indiscriminate
ex ante approach to large-scale infringements has some normative appeal.
On the other hand, it creates a perception that a few individuals are
arbitrarily being singled out in a "litigation lottery."
Another source of discontent is the six-figure statutory damage
awards, as applied in Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset62 and Sony BMG
Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum.63 It has not been lost on the public that
these awards extend well beyond the means of the single mother and
graduate student that those cases involved. More generally, there is a public
sentiment that the awards are disproportionate and excessive.6 4 Some argue
59. John Borland, RIAA Settles with 12-Year-Old Girl, CNET NEWS (Sept. 9, 2003, 4:05 PM),
http://news.com.com/2102-1027_3-5073717.html?tag=st.util.print.
60. Andrew Orlowski, RJAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (U.K.) (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30 AM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa suesthe dead/.
61. See Nate Anderson, The "Legal Blackmail" Business: Inside a P2P-Settlement Factory,
WIRED (Oct. 3, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/10/the-legal-blackmail-
business/; Eric Bangeman, RIAA "Exortion ": Why the Only RICO They Fear Is Suave, ARS TECiNICA
(May 7, 2007, 12:41 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/05/riaa-extortion-why-the-
only-rico-they-fear-is-suave.ars; Corynne MeSherry, Sensible Data Retention Policies Help Prevent
RIAA Harassment, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 28, 2007),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/03/sensible-data-retention-policies-help-prevent-riaa-harassment;
The Anti-Anti-Piracy Campaign: CEA Tells RIAA To Stop Harassing People, QUICKJUMP GAMING
NETWORK (Apr. 27, 2006, 7:51 PM), http://www.qj.net/qjnet/apple/the-anti-anti-piracy-campaign-cea-
tells-riaa-to-stop-harassing-people.html.
62. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008). The court
eventually reduced the award on remand stating that "[t]he need for deterrence cannot justify a $2
million verdict for stealing and illegally distributing 24 songs for the sole purpose of obtaining free
music. Moreover, although Plaintiffs were not required to prove their actual damages, statutory
damages must still bear some relation to actual damages." Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680
F. Supp. 2d. 1045, 1048-49 (D. Minn. 2010).
63. Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cvl 1446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009). See also Denise Lavoie, Jury Awards $675K in Boston Music
Downloading Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 31, 2009, available at bttp://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/32236444/ns/technologyand science-security/t/jury-awards-k-music-downloading-case/.
64. See Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory
Damage Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 53 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/CopyrightDamages.pdf (a debate discussing whether large
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that the punitive nature of the awards is inappropriate because the statutory
damage framework, as intended by Congress, merely seeks to substitute for
actual damages. 65 Arguably, because substantive due process protections
prohibit grossly excessive awards, statutory damage awards in copyright
actions should be subject to additional scrutiny.66 Others suggest that, given
the latest developments, the statutory damage law should be reformed to
incorporate a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
infringement.67 Generally, such criticism reflects a concern with a lack of
balance between the entertainment industry's chosen means and its ends.68
The unpopularity of the litigation campaign is illustrated by online
initiatives that seek to subsidize the settlement payment of unlucky
defendants. 69
The normative appeal of file sharing further amplifies the adverse
reaction to the strict enforcement of copyright law.70 Teenagers are
convinced that file-sharing technology has many beneficial uses and that
copyright law is outdated or biased toward music publishers. In this view,
statutory damage awards are constitutional); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the
Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects ofAggregating Minimum Statutory Damages
for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REv. 525, 526 (2004).
65. Barker, supra note 64, at 556-59. See also Colin Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music:
Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement
Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010) (arguing in favor of due process evaluation of statutory
damages).
66. Barker, supra note 64, at 536.
67. Anna Cronk, Note, The Punishment Doesn't Fit the Crime-Why and How Congress Should
Revise the Statutory Copyright Damages Provision for Noncommercial Infringements on Peer-jo-Peer
File-Sharing Networks, 39 Sw. L. REv. 181, 195-98 (2009).
68. See Daniel Reynolds, Note, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives More
Compatible with Public Morality, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 977, 978-87 (2008).
69. See, e.g., Show Your Support, JOEL FIGHTS BACK, http://joelfightsback.com/get-
involved/donate/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011) (taking donations for Joel Tenenbaum, the defendant in
Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum).
70. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 19; Strahilevitz, supra note 19 (arguing that computer code
may solve collective action problems). The definition of "social norm" is somewhat illusive. For the
purpose at hand, we side with the notion that a social norm is a "social regularity"-a behavior that is in
fact widely adopted in society not only because it is what people do, but also because it corresponds
with a normative conception within society, or a subgroup thereof, of what people should do. See
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338
(1997). Where necessary, we will distinguish between personal norms (moral standards attributed to an
individual) and social norms (standards attributed to a group or collective). See Michael Wenzel, An
Analysis ofNorm Processes in Tax Compliance, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 213-15 (2004). As we will
see, however, the distinction between both categories loses some relevance because (1) generally, social
norms are often internalized, and (2) in our results, perhaps through a self-serving bias, the social norm
evaluation of respondents correlates with personal norms. Differences between personal and social
norms, however, are highly relevant to policy recommendations. There is existing literature that
provides insightful theoretical and empirical insights into the origins of social norms.
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file sharing is to "be embraced rather than feared"71 because "technology
makes it possible to make an unlimited number of perfect copies" 72 and
distribute those copies to millions of users "at no cost to the content
provider." 73 As early as 2003, surveys have indicated that a substantial
number of teenagers believe that sharing digital music is morally
acceptable. 74 A Gallup poll indicated that 15 percent of teenagers under the
age of seventeen believed that it was "morally wrong" to download "music
from the Internet for free."7" Similarly, survey evidence indicates that less
than half of teenagers believe that punishment is appropriate for illegal
downloading. 76
B. THE INADVERTENT COSTS OF DETERRENCE
Clearly, the more salient and publicized features of the litigation
campaign have undermined public support for the enforcement of copyright
law. But how much should negative public attitudes be of concern to
content right holders? Can content industries afford to ignore public
backlash? Perhaps content industries are wise to rely on deterrence. From a
narrow rational choice perspective, ramping up deterrence certainly holds
promise. If the behavior of file sharers is determined simply by the
expected costs and benefits of their actions, the statutory remedy
precedents in Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset and Sony BMG Music
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum might be salient enough to discourage some
amount of file sharing." Similarly, laws that disconnect Internet access
could boost deterrence significantly by increasing the expected costs of
illegal file sharing.78
Increasingly, however, social science scholarship employs accounts of
71. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics ofDigital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (2003).
72. Id. at 264.
73. Id. at 268.
74. See, e.g., Steven Hanway & Linda Lyons, Teens OK With Letting Music Downloads Play,
GALLUP POLL, Sept. 30, 2003, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/9373/teens-letting-music-
downloads-play.aspx (reporting that 83 percent of teenagers in the age group of thirteen to seventeen
find nothing wrong with file sharing).
75. Id.
76. Memorandum from KRC Research to Interested Parties, Topline Results of Microsoft Survey
of Teen Attitudes on Illegal Downloading 2 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/download/press/2008/ 02-13KRCStudy.pdf. By contrast, 90 percent indicated punishment
was appropriate for stealing a bike. Id. at 3.
77. See generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526
(1970) (constructing a theory of rational enforcement).
78. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) (explaining
fundamental concepts of the economic approach to law),
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human behavior that advise against purely coercive approaches to
enforcement. In the normative conception of compliance, for instance,
individuals observe legal regulations because they believe it is the right
thing to do. Social psychologists provide evidence that legal obedience is
"morality based" or "legitimacy based." 79 Human interaction with law thus
depends largely on whether people believe that the law is "just" or
produced by a legitimate regulator.so Similarly, writings in the fields of
sociology, psychology, and economics propose that the effectiveness of law
enforcement is influenced by preexisting beliefs and norms as well as by
the private costs and benefits of the behavior itself.8 ' This research suggests
that legitimacy and norms influence behavior more than formal sanctions
do. 82
The flipside of this coin is that people might decide not to obey a legal
rule if it is considered "unjust" or if a lawmaker is perceived to be
"illegitimate." As a result, even when it may be irrational from a cost-
benefit perspective, some unlawful behavior will occur simply because the
underlying law conflicts with an individual's preexisting notions of justice
and legitimacy. Normative intuitions about morality might cause
individuals to neglect some of the costs associated with the illegal
79. For instance, in the context of tax compliance, there exists extensive literature on the
assumption that "social motivations rather than mere selfishness . .. affect taxpaying behaviour, such as
ethical concerns and social norms, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy." Michael Wenzel, Motivation
or Rationalisation? Causal Relations Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 491, 492 (2005) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Simon James
et al., Developing a Tax Compliance Strategy for Revenue Services, 55 BULL, FOR INT'L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 158 (2001)). See also John S. Carroll, Compliance with the Law: A Decision-Making
Approach to Taxpaying, 11 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 319 (1987) (applying decisionmaking models to tax
law); James et al., supra at 163.
80. TYLER, supra note 79, at 3-4.
81. Id. at 45-56. See also Tracey L. Meares, Signaling, Legitimacy, and Compliance: A
Comment on Posner's Law and Social Norms and Criminal Law Policy, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 410
& nn.27-28 (2002). Similarly, Paul Robinson has argued that some features of criminal law can be
explained by the objective to align the law with "laypersons' intuitions of justice." Paul H. Robinson,
Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus Normative
Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1841 (2000). Robinson also argues that "the extent of criminal
law's moral authority determines the extent of its ability to shape community norms and to influence
people's conduct through normative forces." Id. at 1840.
82. A number of empirical studies find that norms and beliefs are a stronger determinant of
compliance than deterrence. See, e.g., James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze,
Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141, 141, 163 (1999); Ana de
Juan, Miguel A. Lasheras & Rafaela Mayo, Voluntary Tax Complaint Behavior ofSpanish Income Tax
Payers, 49 PUB. FIN. 90, 90 (1994); Michael Wenzel, The Social Side ofSanctions: Personal and Social
Norms as Moderators ofDeterrence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 547, 549-50 (2004). For an overview on
normative beliefs and tax compliance, see Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and




But the impact of conflicts between deterrence and morality- or
legitimacy-based intuitions might extend even further. When behavior is
driven by normative viewpoints, imposing laws that are perceived as
"unjust" or "illegitimate" might reinforce and strengthen the underlying
opposition against those laws.83 There is scholarship that highlights the
problematic nature of vigorous legal condemnations of norms in some
settings, noting that the interaction of law and norms often strengthens a
preexisting antisocial norm. 84 In the context of criminal law, William
Stuntz applies the term "self-defeating crimes" to describe situations where
"criminalization can work against the very norms on which it rests,"ss
causing "popular norms ... to move in the opposite direction from the
law."86 Enforcement may reinforce or strengthen a belief that the legal
regime is not legitimate or that a legal rule is unjust, especially if the public
perceives the legal sanction to be excessive in relation to the punished
behavior. In the context of tax compliance, for example, several studies
document that enforcement measures can backfire and cause an overall
increase of tax evasion.87 Other notable examples include the failed
historical enforcement against alcohol during the Prohibition era,88 and, in
83. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
609 (1998); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 683, 715-36 (1999); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 805, 816-30 (1998).
84. For a theoretical model, see generally Parisi & Von Wangenheim, supra note 20 (describing
a cycle of opinion formation whereby public acts of disobedience and protest undermine the legitimacy
of legislation, which leads to further opposition).
85. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 1872.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. See John S. Carroll, A Psychological Approach to Deterrence: The Evaluation of Crime
Opportunities, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1512, 1520 (1978); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald
E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior,
17 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 330-35 (1980); Kent W. Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on
Noncompliance: A Sequential Decision Model, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 350, 366-67 (1990). See
generally Lederman, supra note 82 (providing an overview of various studies on norms in the area of
tax compliance).
88. See generally KENNETH ALLSOP, THE BOOTLEGGERS: THE STORY OF CHICAGO'S
PROHIBITION ERA (1968) (describing causes of success and failure in the enforcement campaign on
bootlegging); ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF EXCESS (1962) (tracking the social history
of the prohibition movement); Joseph R. Gusfield, Prohibition: The Impact ofPolitical Utopianism, in
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA: THE 1920's 257 (John Braeman, Robert
H. Bremner & David Brody eds., 1968) (following the impact of the Prohibition movement in the
United States). See also LARRY ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE: THE LOST WAR AGAINST LIQUOR 177-
87 (1979); Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol
Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MILBANK Q. 461, 466-69 (1991).
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the past few decades, the war on drugs as it relates to soft drugs.89
Similarly, countervailing normative effects might explain file sharers'
continued persistence despite increased enforcement efforts by content
holders. If, by observing the impact of enforcement, individuals conclude
that the underlying rules are illegitimate, file sharers may be more likely to
disobey the law. The potential undermining effect of normatively excessive
deterrence presents a vexing dilemma for content holders. Litigation
informs copiers of the danger involved with illegal sharing, but at the same
time, the adverse normative impact of enforcement may actually induce
additional infringements.
The normative costs of elevated penalties can undermine the overall
deterrent effect in the following ways. First, normatively excessive
enforcement measures might cause potential infringers to disregard the law
on nonconsequential grounds. If the deterrent or coercive aspects of
enforcement create a belief that the underlying legal rules are unjust,
individuals might decide to disobey the law-despite the added costs
associated with breaking the law. Second, violating an unjust or immoral
law might sometimes increase utility to an individual, perhaps sufficiently
so that it outweighs the costs associated with the illegal behavior. Finally,
in the long run, normatively excessive deterrence may undermine the
political support for the underlying protected rights. Changing social
attitudes might lead political actors to revoke the available rights or
remedies.
This raises the potential that the normative costs of deterrence may
cancel out the benefits of enforcement. At an optimal level, a deterrence
strategy balances the marginal deterrent effect of enforcement against
marginal normative costs of deterrence.90 Consider for instance, two
89. "[A]fter the expenditure of billions of dollars on a policy built primarily on the coercion and
punishment of drug distributors and users, the War on Drugs has failed to reduce significantly, much
less eliminate, drugs as a problem in our society." David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on
Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 237 (1994) (discussing the
negative impact of drug war policies on constitutional norms and racial equality). For a historical
review of the war on drugs, see generally JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001) (discussing the
United States' missteps in addressing the country's drug problem); STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE
WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY (1990) (following the United States's failure
to effectively regulate the cocaine drug trade).
90. Additionally, a deterrence policy should consider the non-normative costs of overdeterrence.
The conventional concept of overdeterrence in the economic analysis of law describes how the fear of
incurring liability may cause individuals to forego socially valuable activities. See A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 7
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008). Severe malpractice penalties, for instance, might
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modalities of enforcement. A first approach imposes higher penalties, while
a second approach applies more moderate penalties. Because of the higher
penalties, the first modality generates higher levels of deterrence (+5) than
the second, more moderate approach (+3). When taking into account the
normative effects described above, however, the more stringent
enforcement condition may nonetheless be less productive overall. If, for
instance, modality one creates a strong adverse normative reaction (-6),
while the more moderate sanctions of modality two produce a less adverse
normative reaction (-1), the overall value of enforcing modality one is
negative (-1) while it is positive for modality two (+2).
This proposition stands in stark contrast to the statement, voiced by
copyright industry representatives, that strong-armed litigation tactics are
sensible because they educate the public on the content of copyright law
and, in doing so, may cultivate pro-copyright viewpoints. In this regard, the
entertainment industry's litigation campaign can be considered an effort to
promote copyright compliance by inducing a belief that file sharing is
unfair to authors. 91 Perhaps by focusing attention on the legal rights of
copyright holders, the industry hoped to shift preferences in favor of
copyright holders. Indeed, the literature on the expressive function of the
law states that legal rules, especially if formulated by lawmakers who are
perceived to be legitimate, may cause individuals to align preferences with
the goals expressed in legal rules.92
These competing claims reveal the potential ambiguity with regard to
the normative effects of enforcement. In order to examine the normative
effects of enforcement, we conducted two studies to test the hypothesis that
copyright enforcement may inadvertently move anti-copyright behavior
and norms in the opposite direction from that intended by the law. 93
Although, as mentioned above, a few studies have explored the interaction
between deterrence and norms with regard to tax evasion, the
deter malicious or negligent conduct, but they might also cause medical professionals to develop
otherwise costly defensive medical practices in order to avoid any possible accusations of wrongdoing.
91. A number of empirical studies report that norms and beliefs can be a stronger determinant of
compliance than traditional means of deterrence. See supra note 82.
92. When law creates a focal point by expressing values that might tip norms to a new
equilibrium, this process may create a social norm or internalize a normative value. Robert Cooter,
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585 (1998). See also GARY S. BECKER,
ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 1-2 (1996). The idea of law as a focal point that coordinates expectations
among citizens is explored further in Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,
86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).
93. A legal condemnation of a norm might have the unintended effect of moving "equilibrium
behavior ... in the opposite direction from that intended by the law." Parisi & von Wangenheim, supra
note 20, at 2.
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countervailing norm-effect hypothesis awaits further examination.9 4 Part IV
collects and discusses new evidence on the effects of enforcement on social
attitudes and public norms in the context of copyright law.
IV. STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION & MAIN RESULTS
In an attempt to advance our understanding of the interaction between
norms and deterrence, we explore the dynamics of enforcement on self-
reported norm evaluations in the context of two experimental studies.
The results suggest that copyright norms and individuals' evaluation
of the music industry's enforcement policies are negatively affected by the
enforcement of copyright law. We observed that increases in the severity
and certainty of punishment generate more powerful anti-copyright norms.
Also, enhanced sanctions appear to bolster adverse positions toward the
music industry's policies.9 5
We further explored this counterproductive effect by looking at
potential differences between various types of infringers. We found that the
degree of backlash positively correlated with the amount of downloading
students engaged in before participating in the studies. Increased levels of
enforcement produce higher levels of anti-copyright resentment and
backlash among students who regularly downloaded music from file-
sharing networks. Our results suggest that there might be a tipping point
involving the amount of downloads and norms: at a certain level of
experience with downloading copyright-infringing content, the normative
evaluation of enforcement policies becomes more negative. 96
94. Some scholars have argued that improved enforcement may backfire and produce increased
tax evasion, but these viewpoints are contested. For a review of empirical evidence on the proposition
that enforcement may backfire, see Lederman, supra note 82. Lederman concludes that
In sum, the speculation that sanctions for tax evasion will tend to undermine compliance does
not seem to be supported by the evidence. In the experimental context, the availability of
sanctions for failure to cooperate increases cooperation. In the tax compliance context, audits
increase even compliance of those not threatened with audit.
Id. at 1499 (footnotes omitted).
95. Interestingly, as we will describe in more detail, an equivalent increase in the probability of
enforcement did not affect anti-industry positions, perhaps because the effectiveness of enforcement is
partially determined by technological progress, which is unrelated to the influence of the music industry
on the political process.
96. On the internalization of social norms, see Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good
Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1597-1600 (2000)
[hereinafter Cooter, Good Citizens]; Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law:
Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2000) [hereinafter Cooter, Three
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Moreover, our results indicate that the backlash effect also extends to
illegal downloading. When asked whether they would resume downloading
once novel technological developments provided immunity, file sharers
who were previously subjected to a more stringent enforcement regime
indicated that they planned to download more.97 Further, students faced
with more severe sanctions in the first phase reported that they would
download more, as compared to participants who were presented with more
moderate sanctions. 98
B. METHODOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES
Our study applied a scenario methodology to examine the sensitivity
of respondents to different degrees of copyright enforcement. We paid
particular attention to differences between frequent users of file-sharing
technology and those individuals who were less experienced with this
technology.
Participants were invited to participate in the experiments on the basis
of their enrollment in an undergraduate, introductory political science class.
Students were unaware that the experiment would be conducted in class on
the day the study occurred. None of the students had taken classes in
intellectual property law or copyright law. To avoid underreporting 99 and
esteem-based distortions,10 the survey was conducted anonymously in a
large auditorium with a seating capacity of 630. Participants were informed
that the survey was part of a study on "how people respond to copyright
enforcement." No financial compensation was offered for participating in
the study.
Students who had never used file-sharing technology completed items
that were not relevant for the purposes of the present study and were
excluded from further analysis.
A total of 404 freshman students participated in two experiments. The
participants were predominantly female (252) and ranged in age between
eighteen and twenty-four. Only students who indicated that they had
illegally downloaded one or more files participated in the scenario study.
Effects].
97. See infra Part IV.C.
98. Id.
99. Licbowitz, Creative Destruction, supra note 42, at 8.
100. Colin F. Camerer, & Ernst Fchr, Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using
Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists, in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY 55 (Joseph
Hcnrich et al. eds. 2004).
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Students that completed Study 1 did not participate in Study 2. Both studies
employed the same materials and procedures.
In both experiments we manipulated the severity and certainty of
sanctions. In the first study, one group of participants received a scenario
with a low severity of sanction ($20) in combination with either a low
(0.01%) or high (20%) probability of sanction, while another group
received a vignette that had a sanction with a high severity ($20,000) in
combination with either a low (0.01%) or high (20%) probability of
sanction. 101
1. Study 1
Study 1 consisted of two phases. In the first phase of the scenario, we
examined norm evaluations under different modalities of enforcement. In
the second phase, participants were asked to indicate how their individual
downloading behavior would change if the probability of apprehension was
reduced to zero.
We presented each group of respondents with different enforcement
conditions. We applied the following modalities of enforcement
(independent variables): individual conditions varied between (1) low
(1/10,000 or 0.01%) or high (1/5 or 20%) rates of probability of
punishment, and (2) low ($20) or high ($20,000) severity of punishment for
each downloaded song. Each participant was assigned randomly to either
101. These figures are based on the potential remedies applicable on the basis statutory award
provisions in the Copyright Act. We also conducted a pilot study that measured subjects' perception of
what amounts to low or high probability and low or high severity of punishment in the context of
copyright infringement through file sharing. In the pilot study, sixty-three participants were requested to
indicate on a 7-point Likert scale whether they agreed with the following statements:
(1) if you are caught for illegally downloading music, you will have to pay $2000 for each
downloaded song or file-this punishment is severe; (2) if you are caught for illegally
downloading music, you will have to pay $20 for each downloaded song or file-this
punishment is severe; (3) the chance of getting caught for illegally downloading music is
0.001% (1 in 100,000 file sharers)-the probability of getting punished is high; and (4) the
chance of getting caught for illegally downloading music is 20% (1 in 5),-the probability of
getting punished is high.
A Likert-type scale, named after psychologist Rensis Likert, is a psychometric scale that is
widely used in survey research and questionnaires. See Rensis Likert, A Technique for the Measurement
ofAttitudes, 22 ARCHIVES OF PSYCH. 140 (1932) (explaining the function of the Likert scale). A paired
t-test yielded a significant effect (t(62) = 9.25, p < 0.001) for severity of punishment, indicating that
participants viewed low severity of punishment (Mean ("M") = -0.22, Standard Deviation ("SD") =
1.88) as less severe than high severity of punishment (M = -2.03, SD = 1.57). A similar analysis was
conducted for probability of punishment, revealing a significant effect (t(62) = -6.76, p < 0.001).
Participants indicated that a low probability of punishment (M = -0.84, SD = 1.89) is less probable than
a high probability of punishment (M = 1.71, SD= 1.86).
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the low or high probability of punishment condition and to either the low or
high severity of punishment condition.
In order to measure the normative effects and behavioral responses to
the various enforcement conditions, we presented a list of statements to the
participant in the study. The following statements (dependent variables)
were used throughout Study 1:
(a) Anti-Copyright Viewpoints in Phase 1. Four items measured anti-
copyright norms: (1) "these new developments are gradually making me
realize that downloading music illegally is not ethical," (2) "because of
these changes I will adjust my position regarding illegal downloading,"
(3) "these developments are causing me to adjust my norms regarding
illegal exchanges of music," and (4) "because of these new developments I
will purchase more music through legal business avenues."
(b) Evaluation of the Enforcement Policies by the Music Industry in
Phase 1. Three items assessed the participants' evaluation of the music
industry's enforcement policies: (1) "I am of the opinion that the music
industry is conducting an unjust, disproportionate policy," (2) "the policies
of the music industry conflict with my sense of justice," and (3) "the
policies of the music industry are an attack on my freedom to listen to
music."l02
(c) Behavioral Adjustment in Phase 2. Four items measured
behavioral adjustment: (1) "I will resume downloading," (2) "I will make
up for lost time and increase my downloading activities," (3) "I will resume
downloading because I disagree with the enforcement policy of the record
industry," and (4) "I will continue to download less because I realize that
the record industry is losing a lot of money due to illegal downloads."' 03
After reading a randomly assigned enforcement scenario, respondents
provided their responses on the basis of a seven-point scale, assigning
scores between two endpoints of (1) "strong disagreement" and (7) "strong
agreement" (an answer of "1" indicated that the student strongly disagreed
with the statement; an answer of "7" indicated that the student strongly
agreed).104
102. These items were combined to form one average score (M = 3.90; SD = 1.37; L.J.
Cronbach's a ("alpha") = 0.87). Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient of reliability, commonly used as a
measure of the internal consistency or reliability of a psychometric test score for a sample of examinces.
See Lee J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 297
(1951).
103. Statistically, the scale showed sufficient internal consistency (M = 4.54; SD = 1.14;
Cronbach's alpha = 0.74).
104. Items 2, 3, and 4 were reverse coded and combined with item I to form one average anti-
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2. Study 2
In Study 2 we applied conditions of high probability (and low
severity) as well as high severity (and low probability) while holding the
expected costs constant across both conditions. By controlling the expected
costs in the different conditions, Study 2 enabled us to assess the relative
impact of the severity and probability of the sanctions on download
behavior in the first phase of the study. We therefore measured download
behavior not only in the second phase (as in Study 1), but also in the first
phase.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two groups with the
following enforcement conditions (independent variables): one group was
subjected to an enforcement regime with a high certainty but low severity
of punishment (20% probability of a fine of $50), while a second group
faced a converse punishment schedule (0.1% probability of $10,000). At
ten dollars each, the expected cost of downloading is identical in both
scenarios.
Participants in Study 2 completed a survey containing the items from
the first study: anti-copyright viewpoints, the evaluation of the music
industry's enforcement policies, and download behavior in phase 2.
Additionally, we included two items to measure download behavior in
phase 1: (1) "I will download more music" and (2) "I will download less
music."io0
3. Analysis
Our analysis of the effect of enforcement modalities on the various
groups of individual file sharers and non-file sharers, distinguished
between different scenarios that varied the hypothetical probability of
enforcement and the severity of sanctions. Again, we randomly assigned
the different scenarios to respondents.
In analyzing the responses, we looked for differences between
respondents on the basis of their prior file-sharing experience. Throughout
the study, we used the terms "occasional," "average," and "frequent" file
sharers to distinguish between respondents on the basis of the amount of
music that they download on peer-to-peer networks. This distinction is
important, as will be discussed, because effective copyright enforcement
copyright norm score.
105. Item 2 was reverse coded and combined with item I to form a separate score indicating the
average download behavior among participants.
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measures might require a different approach toward habitual file sharers
versus occasional file sharers.
The scenario methodology, as employed in this study, has certain
strengths and weaknesses. Generally, scenario studies combine the benefits
of laboratory research and correlation research.' 06 Our study design enabled
us to analyze causality by manipulating the independent variables, while
using realistic, everyday situations based on statutory rules and case law.'0 7
As is the case with all laboratory experiments, a study of this nature is, of
course, susceptible to the criticism that the results cannot be generalized to
the public at large. For the present purpose, however, this criticism is less
damaging. By exclusively enlisting college students, our design measures
the reactions of the specific group that was targeted in the litigation
campaign by the entertainment industry. Finally, a general limitation of any
scenario study is that it does not measure actual behavior in the real world.
In this context however, a research design involving actual downloading by
respondents is not feasible due to the copyright-infringing nature of the
activities involved.
Finally, a few notes on terminology. We refrain from using the term
"antisocial" conduct to describe file-sharing practices. This would carry
assumptions and arguments that are outside the ambit of this Article.
Instead, we employ the more neutral terms "pro-copyright" and "anti-
copyright" to indicate the areas where, respectively, content producers and
file-sharing consumers are at opposite sides of the spectrum. We realize
that even this choice of terminology is open for discussion considering the
view, held by some commentators, that peer-to-peer file sharing is not in
conflict with the goals of copyright law. 0 8
C. FINDINGS
Our results indicate that conditions involving high probabilities of
punishment generate higher degrees of anti-copyright norms than lower
probabilities of punishment.109 Severity of punishment also had a
106. See, e.g., David De Cremer & Daan Van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders Promote
Cooperation? The Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858 (2002).
107. See Robert L. Dipboye, Laboratory vs. Field Research in Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, 5 INT'L. REV. INDUS. & ORG'L PSYCHOL. 1, 25 (1990) (discussing the legitimacy of
laboratory research studies).
108. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 71 (suggesting that file sharing necessitates a new business model
but benefits artists as a group).
109. We derived this result by conducting separate 2 (probability of punishment) x 2 (severity of
punishment) ANCOVAs with total songs downloaded as a covariate for (a) anti-copyright norms, and
(b) evaluation of the music industry's enforcement policies. An analysis of covariance ("ANCOVA") is
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significant effect, indicating that stronger sanctions produce higher degrees
of anti-copyright norms than moderate sanctions. Additional tests revealed
that copyright norms are more negative where there is a high probability
and high severity of punishment, compared to the other three conditions
(that is, the low severity/low probability condition, the low severity/high
probability condition, and the high severity/low probability condition).








Low severity of punishment High severity of punishment
- Probability of punishment low - Probability of punishment high
Figure 1 above illustrates these observations. First, note that all
students reported relatively high levels of anti-copyright norms (between
4.8-4.9 on a seven-point scale where "7" equals "I completely disagree"
with statements such as "downloading music illegally is not ethical"),110
regardless of the particular enforcement regime. Second, while evaluations
for other enforcement conditions are relatively uniform, the assessments for
high-probability and high-severity conditions are much more negative (as
indicated by the light grey line that extends to the top right corner of the
graph above).
a general linear model with a continuous outcome variable and two or more predictor variables. An
ANCOVA tests whether certain factors have an effect on the outcome variable after removing the
variance for which quantitative predictors (covariates) account. See, e.g., Gerard J.P. Van Breukelen &
Koene R.A. Van Dijk, Letter to the Editor: Use of Covariates in Randomized Controlled Trials, 13 J.
INT'L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL Soc'Y 903, 903-04 (2007). An overview of the results, including
additional figures containing the means, standard deviations, and statistical effects, etc. are provided in
table I in the appendix below.
110. See infra items reported for (1) Anti-Copyright Viewpoints in Phase I.
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The evaluation of the music industry's enforcement policies revealed
that strong sanctions caused relatively strong contra-music industry
positions, while moderate punishment generated less aversion to the music
industry's policies.
In order to interpret the results, we divided the participants into
different groups based on the frequency with which they engaged in
downloading on file-sharing networks."' We divided the participants into
an "occasional" user group (one hundred students with less than seventy
downloaded songs), an "average" user group (fifty-one students with one
hundred downloaded songs), and a "frequent" user group (fifty-eight
participants with more than 150 downloaded songs)." 2 We observed that
"frequent" and "average" users had stronger contra-music industry
positions than "occasional" users (see table 1 in appendix and figure 3).
In the second phase of Study 1, we informed students that a new
technology now fully shielded them from all enforcement. We asked
participants if, and to what extent, they would resume downloading in light
of this immunity.1 3 The results indicated that participants who previously
faced severe sanctions in the first phase, engaged in more downloading
relative to participants that initially faced more moderate sanctions. Finally,
"frequent" users downloaded more in the second phase than "average" and
"occasional" users. Overall, these results clearly indicate of a backlash
effect on downloading behavior.
It is worthwhile to focus on the "frequent" users separately. Because
an important goal of sanctions is to prevent lawbreakers from continuing
their illegal activities, "frequent" users are an important target group. Our
analysis indicates that "frequent" users, who previously faced a low
probability of punishment in the first phase of the scenario, would
download less than "frequent" users who had been previously subject to
high probability enforcement conditions. A similar trend was observed for
Ill We used the covariate for this purpose.
112. More technically, such a division was helpful because the distribution of the total number of
downloads reported in our sample departed from the normal distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
test indicated a significant deviation from normality, z = 4.81, p < 0.001. Generally, a Kolmogorov-
Smimov statistic quantifies a distance between the empirical distribution function of the sample and the
cumulative distribution function of the reference distribution, or between the empirical distribution
functions of two samples. See, e.g., W.T. EADIE ET AL., STATISTICAL METHODS IN EXPERIMENTAL
PHYSICS 269-71 (1971). A substantial number of participants (N = 51) indicated that they had
downloaded one hundred files, and no other participants reported downloading a number of files in the
range of seventy and 150.
113. A separate 2 (probability of punishment) x 2 (severity of punishment) ANCOVA was
conducted with the total amount of downloads as a covariate, and individual downloading behavior as
the dependent variable. For an overview of the results, see supra Table 1.
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the severity of sanctions. "Frequent" users facing moderate punishments in
the first phase of the scenario reported lower download activity levels than
"frequent" users previously faced with severe sanctions.
To summarize, two main results were obtained in Study 1. During
Phase 1, a counterproductive effect on pro-copyright sentiments was
revealed in relation to the probability and the severity of sanctions. Raising
the level of both severity and certainty of enforcement produced a
potentially powerful counterproductive effect, increasing anti-copyright
norms. A key result also emerged in Phase 2, where the backlash effect of
legal condemnations was observed to extend to underlying download
behavior. As we discuss in more detail in the following part, the normative
backlash effect has important implications for copyright enforcement
policy.
In Study 2, our analysis of the different effects between "high-
severity/low-probability" and "moderate-severity/high-probability"
enforcement conditions revealed a significant effect of the type of
enforcement regime on anti-copyright norms.1 14 Participants in the high-
severity/low-probability condition evaluated copyright norms more
negatively than participants in the moderate-severity/low-probability
condition. The covariate-total number of downloads-yielded a
significant effect, suggesting that high-severity/low-probability conditions
had a stronger deterrent effect (that is, when faced with this enforcement
condition, students reported that they would reduce their downloading
activities more). The elevated, light-shaded grey bars in figure 2 illustrate
how high-severity/low-probability enforcement conditions generate higher
backlash effects as well as higher levels of deterrence than low-
severity/high-probability enforcement-even though, interestingly, both
enforcement regimes impose identical expected costs.
114. We conducted three one-way ANCOVAs with total shared files downloaded as a covariate,
enforcement regime as the independent variable, and anti-copyright norms, evaluation of the music
industry's enforcement policies, and downloading behavior as the dependent variables. Table 2 presents
an overview of the results.
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FIGURE 2. Effect of Enforcement on Anti-Copyright Norms, Evaluation of







Anti-copyright norms Evaluation of the enforcement
policies by the music industry
Download behavior
a Low severity/High probability uHigh severity/Low probability
In order to interpret these results, we divided the participants into
different user groups"' based on their download background: we
differentiated between "occasional" users, "average" users, and "frequent"
users. The results indicate that "frequent" users hold stronger anti-
copyright norms than "occasional" and "average" users.
The type of enforcement regime also impacted the evaluation of the
music industry's enforcement policies-participants in the high-
severity/low-punishment condition endorsed a relatively strong contra-
music-industry position, whereas low-severity/high-probability
enforcement regimes fostered relatively lower levels of aversion for the
policies of the music industry. The covariate had a significant effect.
115. As in Study 1, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test indicated a substantial deviation for the total
number of downloads, z = 3.12, p <0.001.
0 4 .......
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"Frequent" file sharers evaluate the music industry more negatively than
"occasional" users of file sharing technology. Especially participants in the
"frequent" user group hold stronger contra-music-industry positions than
"average" and "occasional" users.
We also observed a significant effect of the type of enforcement
regime on download behavior in phase 1. Participants in the high-
severity/low-probability condition reported that they would download less
than participants in the low-severity/high-probability condition. The
covariate also yielded a significant effect, indicating that "frequent" users
would reduce their downloading activities more so than "average" and
"occasional" users.
As in Study 1, we focused on "frequent" users separately because they
represent the most interesting group for assessing the effects of copyright
enforcement. As figure 3 illustrates, our analysis of download behavior in
phase 2 of Study 2 demonstrates that "frequent" users are more likely than
"occasional" and "average" users to exhibit backlash effects.116 Our
analysis also revealed a significantly stronger backlash effect among
"frequent" users of file-sharing technologies that were subjected to a high-
severity/low-probability condition in the first phase than "frequent" users
who previously faced low-severity/high-probability enforcement
conditions.
116. See infra Table 2.
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FIGURE 3. Effect of Enforcement on Anti-Copyright Norms, the
Enforcement Policies by the Music Industry, Download Behavior, and










A. PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND SELF-INTEREST
The litigation campaign of the content industries has generally focused
on the gravest offenders who make available "'substantial' amounts of
music online to others over peer-to-peer networks.""' As a result,
university students have been the primary targets."' This enforcement
strategy has several potential rationales. By deterring those who make
available a substantial number of music files, the overall access to illegal
content online might be reduced. Moreover, by going after the most severe
infringers, the industry hopes to draw a normative distinction between
small incursions by the average consumers and more extreme forms of
infringing behavior. Some have disputed the wisdom of this strategy,
117. Katie Dean, Are You in RIAA 's Cross Hairs?, WIRED (June 26, 2003),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2003/06/59392.
118. Music Labels Hunt Net 'Pirates,' BBC NEWS (June 26, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3021126.stm (describing the RIAA's targeting of peer-to-peer
software users, including "four college students [who] agreed to pay damages after being sued by the
RIAA").
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however, because it reduces the deterrent effect on the broader audience of
more moderate file sharers." 9
Our findings provide some insight into the likely impact of this aspect
of the litigation campaign. One main finding of this study is the observed
differences between frequent users and more occasional users of file-
sharing technology. Frequent file sharers exhibit stronger backlash effects:
more stringent enforcement conditions result in adverse public attitudes and
countervailing behavior.
The most straightforward interpretation is that frequent infringers
simply have more to lose from stringent enforcement. The public attitude
of file sharers might simply reflect a self-serving bias. In this regard, prior
research on the bidirectional causality between self-interest and normative
evaluations is informative. In a pioneering study on tax aversion, Michael
Wenzel concludes that taxpayers "adjust their own beliefs so as to justify
their behaviour as right and ethical." 20 According to the theory of
cognitive dissonance,
When we sense something in the world that is inconsistent with the
cognitive frame through which we see the world, we initially
(unconsciously) ignore or distort our perception. If that becomes
impossible, we eventually amend our cognitive frame (i.e., the way we
see and understand the world) to incorporate our new perception.121
For instance, the benefits derived from freely downloading music
online may induce a normative belief that file sharing should be legal. As a
type of self-serving bias, file sharers might adjust their normative positions
regarding downloading because they benefit from the activity ("I want to
download music, so I think prohibiting peer-to-peer activities is unjust").122
Indeed, research on cognitive dissonance suggests that individuals often
adjust their attitudes and beliefs123 when they experience a conflict in their
perceptions of reality.124 Accordingly, file sharers might adjust their beliefs
119. Dean, supra note 117 ("Or, to freak everyone out, the RIAA could choose to sue a smaller
offender.").
120. Wenzel, supra note 79, at 505.
121. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive us Crazy, and How We Can
Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 201 n.213 (1996) (describing how individuals reconcile the
conflict between normative positions and legal regulation).
122. See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Porgarsky, An Experimental Investigation of Deterrence:
Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167 (2003) (presenting experimental
evidence consistent with a self-serving bias).
123. Rosenberg, supra note 121, at 199-200 (describing how people amend their cognitive frame
to reduce conflict by incorporating new perceptions of reality).
124. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983);
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-4 (1957). The classic example of this is
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about file-sharing people to remove the uncomfortable feeling of engaging
in immoral conduct. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that
individuals come to disregard the obvious self-interested origin of such
normative adjustments.1 25
The next step, then, is to "generalise these views to others, presumably
to gain further social support."l 26 Indeed, according to the false consensus
effect, individuals often believe that others are more like themselves than
they really are. As a result, predictions about others' beliefs or behaviors,
based on casual observation, are very likely to err in the direction of our
own personal beliefs or behavior.' 27
More generally, our findings suggest that there might be a tipping
point involving the amount of downloads and normative reactions. At a
certain level of experience with unauthorized downloading and file sharing,
the evaluation of that behavior is internalized.128 As a result of this process
of internalization, the normative position becomes more robust or "sticky"
and presents a more pervasive challenge to law enforcement.
Another plausible explanation lies with social identity theory.' 29 As
users become more accustomed to using file-sharing technology, they
might internalize the norms and ethics of the relevant community or
subculture. In the context of tax compliance, for instance, it has been
observed that taxpayers often follow the norms and behavior of the group
expressed in the fable where a fox sees some high-hanging grapes and wishes to eat them. When the fox
is unable to reach the grapes, he surmises that the grapes are probably not worth eating, as they must not
be ripe or that they are probably sour. AESOP, The Fox and the Grapes, in AESOP'S FABLES 15 (Heidi
Holder ill., 1981).
125. See Wenzel, supra note 79, at 505 (describing two-way causality between self-interest and
normative beliefs).
126. Id.
127. See generally Brian Mullen et al., The False Consensus Effect: A Meta-Analysis of 115
Hypothesis Tests, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 (1985) (discussing 115 studies that
demonstrate the false consensus effect). See also Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The "False
Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias In Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 279, 280 (1977).
128. On the process of social norm internalization and the relation to law, see Cooter, Good
Citizens, supra note 96; Cooter, Three Effects, supra note 96.
129. HENRI TAJFEL, Social Identity and Social Comparison, in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN
SOCIAL GROUPS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 61-76 (1978)
(describing the power of collective psychological processes through group identification). A number of
articles on law and social norms persuasively argue that effective enforcement policies must take into
account how legal sanctions and regulations are perceived by subcultures or social groups. See, e.g.,
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 350 (1997);
Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181, 2184-85 (1996);
McAdams, supra note 70.
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that they identify with. 30 In the context of copyright law, as they begin to
identify with the anti-copyright subculture, a targeted campaign against file
sharers might generate a defensive reaction and have the counterproductive
effect of strengthening the community bond and support among file
sharers.
B. THE IRONY OF DETERRENCE
In moving from moderate settlement demands to potential statutory
rewards of up to $150,000 per illegally downloaded song, the litigation
campaign has ramped up the potential liability exposure involved with file
sharing. 13'
From the data in Study 2, we observed that elevated sanctions have a
stronger effect on deterrence than an equivalent increase in the probability
of punishment-even when the expected costs of punishment remain
identical. This finding violates the axiom of rational choice theory that
activity levels remain unaltered when the expected costs and benefits are
identical. Behavioral refinements of the rational choice model have updated
this belief of course, for instance, by demonstrating the impact of framing
on individuals' risk evaluations. 132 Our findings contribute to this literature
by documenting differences in the sensitivity to varying modalities of
enforcement with regard to the severity and probability of enforcement.
Because the marginal benefits of increasing severity of punishment are
higher than equivalent increases in the probability of punishment, our
results suggest that it will often be more cost effective to enhance
deterrence by raising the severity of the sanction.133
This result is somewhat ironic given the negative norm backlash effect
of punishment observed in Study 1. Throughout our study, we observed
that anti-copyright attitudes are more pronounced for participants in the
high-severity/low-probability condition than for their counterparts in the
low-severity/high-probability condition.
Why do high probabilities induce lower levels of aversion than
130. See supra note 125.
131. See supra Part Il.
132. PAUL WATZLAWICK, JOHN H. WEAKLAND & RICHARD FISCH, CHANGE: PRINCIPLES OF
PROBLEM FORMATION AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION 92-109 (1974) (collecting existing studies); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sa. 453
(1981) (exploring the framing effect in a number of laboratory experiments).




equivalent increases in the severity of sanctions? Perhaps file sharers react
less adversely to elevated probabilities because technological issues, which
are not directly controlled by the content industries, also determine the
probability of apprehension. Potential sanctions, by contrast, are influenced
more directly by the content industries in legal claims (and by prior
political lobbying efforts). Additionally, if the rate of apprehension is low,
elevated sanctions become more salient because they may create the
perception that a few individuals are being singled out.' 34 The perception of
being targeted may, in turn, again bolster a sense of community and kinship
among file sharers. 135 Finally, low probabilities might reduce the overall
support for enforcement because they create an impression that such action
will ultimately fail.' 36
C. ENFORCEMENT AND EXPECTATIONS
Throughout our study, we exposed respondents to different modalities
of enforcement. In our phased scenarios, some respondents moved from
severe conditions to a state of enforcement immunity, while others moved
from more moderate enforcement conditions. We observed a stronger
backlash effect among frequent downloaders that were previously
subjected to more stringent enforcement conditions.
In reality, however, the sequence of enforcement and the subjective
perception of entitlements proceeded from lower to higher degrees of
enforcement. Over the course of the entertainment industry's litigation
campaign, courts accepted expansive interpretations of intermediary
liability,'37 created novel doctrines of copyright infringement,138 and
applied broad interpretations of statutory damage provisions.' 39
One can argue, especially in hindsight, that these decisions constitute
134. See Robert J. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Motivation (MIT Working Paper No. 35, 2008),
available at http://mit.academia.edu/RobertAkerlof/Papers/96712/ATheoryof Social Motivation
(describing social norm formation processes of groups and subcultures).
135. See Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of
Deviance, 15 Soc. PROBS. 175, 175-76 (1967) (describing the process of reaction and counter-reaction
after a subculture is publicly designated as "deviant").
136. LITMAN, supra note 1, at 111.
137. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001)
(confirming district court finding that plaintiffs would likely be successful in establishing that Napster
would be liable as a contributory and vicarious infringer).
138. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (holding
that distributing software with manifest intent to promote copyright infringement can render the
software's distributor liable for the infringing actions of third parties).
139. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cvl446-NG, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009). See also Itzkoff, supra note 8.
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sensible adaptations of copyright law in the face of new circumstances.
During the initial years of file-sharing technology, however, this was not
fully evident. In the early years of a new technology, there is often
considerable ambiguity as to the technology's potential social and
economic implications. Moreover, new technologies may create enough
legal ambiguity so that users of the technology are convinced that no
infringements are committed.140 Even if the issues are relatively clean cut
to legal experts, the ambiguity might be sufficient to enable self-serving
interpretations regarding the legal status of new technology. 14' As research
in the field of cognitive psychology demonstrates, individuals are inclined
to construct facts in ways that align with their own preconceived beliefs. 142
As a result, by the time that the major legal questions were resolved, users
of file-sharing technology are no longer neutral bystanders. First, pro-file-
sharing norms might become internalized at some point.143  When
internalized, such pro-sharing norms become more robust144 and present a
more ardent challenge to legal enforcement efforts. Second, users of new
technology might experience loss aversion when the previously "free"
access to content made available by the new technology is suddenly
illegal. 14' The perception of having something "taken away" might add to
the normative resistance to the enforcement of newly established rights in
copyright law. 146
140. Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 67 (2004) (describing cyclical process of technology,
norm adaptation, and judicial determination).
141. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009) (exploring the enabling effect of legal uncertainty and delay on norm
formation processes).
142. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role Of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 109, 111-16 (1997) (authors assigned participants in a
study to either the plaintiff or defendant in a hypothetical automotive accident tort case with a
maximum potential damages payment of $100,000. The plaintiffs prediction of the likely judicial
award was on average approximately $14,500 higher than the defendant's. The plaintiffs average
nomination of a "fair" figure was approximately $17,700 higher than the defendant's). See generally
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk
Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003) (describing culturally biased interpretations of data).
143. On the internalization of social norms, see Cooter, Good Citizens?, supra note 96; Cooter,
Three Effects, supra note 96, at 17-20.
144. See Geoffery Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music Downloading
and UnsettledSocial Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733, 757-58 (2003).
145. This brings to mind the famous statement of Attorney General Robert Kennedy that "the poor
man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For him the law is always taking something
away." Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Address at University of Chicago Law Day (May 1, 1964)
(cited in Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1247
n.28 (1974)).




In situations where a social group perceives legal sanctions to be
excessive with respect to the behavior that is being punished, enforcement
may inadvertently strengthen preexisting adverse normative positions. This
Article has examined the hypothesis that counterproductive effects can help
explain the pervasiveness of copyright infringements in the face of lawsuits
against file sharers. We investigated empirically the interaction between
copyright enforcement and preexisting norms in two studies that examined
the reactions of copyright infringers to varying probabilistic penalties.
Our results suggest that copyright enforcement is a double-edged
sword. Sanctions have a deterrent effect on file-sharing behavior.
Sanctions, however, can backfire and increase anti-copyright sentiments
among file sharers. This raises particular difficulties for copyright
enforcement because negative norm effects might prevent sanctions from
being set at levels that attain deterrence. Second, our findings suggest that
enforcement efforts would likely be more effective if targeted specifically
to different types of copyright offenders. The results show a backlash effect
for all users, but frequent users especially will download more if previously
faced with punitive enforcement measures. The observed backlash effect
among frequent users casts doubt upon the enforcement tactics employed
by the entertainment industry. By focusing litigation on frequent offenders,
copyright holders bolster anti-copyright norms among this group, while
foregoing opportunities to promote pro-copyright norms among occasional
infringers.
For content holders, the limitations of deterrence-based approaches
increase the importance of fostering social attitudes that support the rights
of copyright holders.'47 Indeed, the attempts by the music and film
industries to associate file sharing with theft and stealing in public relations
campaigns seek to manipulate the underlying social meaning of copyright
infringements. Social norm theorists recognize, however, that norms are
notoriously hard to control.14 8 Moreover, in the copyright context, the
entitlements that they possess more than they would value the exact same thing had they never
possessed it at all. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990); George
Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 157, 165 (1994).
147. See Kahan, supra note 20 (suggesting that gradual approaches are more effective when anti-
legal norms are in place).
148. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537
(2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
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entertainment industry faces opposition from normative frameworks that
advocate for more communal models of cultural exchange and relaxed
copyright standards.' 49 Additionally, the potential role of the government in
fostering pro-copyright norms is limited in this context. Legislative
developments have created a public perception that copyright law is driven
by lobbying and political interest group pressure on behalf of the
entertainment industry.s 0 If litigation against teenagers and universities
was part of a grand strategy to influence the social meaning of file sharing,
it is clear that the industry's copyright campaign has failed. One possible
explanation for this failure lies with the counterproductive norm effects
documented in this Article.
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).
149. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
179-204 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 282-86 (2004).
150. See, e.g., Ian McPherson, Copyright Becomes a Tool of the Cartels, NETNACS, Oct. 2002
(on file with author); John Naughton, Mickey Mouse Threatens to Block All Ideas in Future,
OBSERVER, Feb. 24, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2002/feb/24/
business.columnists. For an analysis of the political process of copyright reform, see generally Jessica
D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. Rev. 275 (1989) (describing





TABLE 1. Study 1, means, standard deviations, and statistical effects of
sanction and user type
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TABLE 2. Study 2, means, standard deviations, and statistical effects of
sanction and user type
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